Evolutionary Approach Highly Informative but Should Not Be Overstated
Dear Editor: I thank The CJP for its thought-provoking issue examining evolutionary explanations for mental illness and, in particular, Dr Edward H Hagen's fascinating article on depression. 1 My patients often find it helpful when their symptoms are presented within an evolutionary context as adaptive mechanisms that are malfunctioning in some way.
However, one issue I would like to call attention to is that significant evolutionary change in humans occurs on large time scales (that is, many generations or millennia). 2 Therefore, it is plausible that current behaviours appearing to be maladaptive were adaptive for our ancestors tens of thousands of years ago but may no longer be useful for modern life. A trivial example would be children's fear of the dark, which may have protected them from nocturnal predators in ages past but currently serves only to make bedtime more difficult.
Let us examine the 2 behaviours that Dr Hagen highlights as possibly adaptive-excessive rumination and suicidality in response to a stressor. Ruminating about a problem until a solution presents may have been a relatively straightforward process in our ancestors whose cognitive sophistication and options for addressing problems were much more limited than our own. In contrast, presentday patients with depression can end up in complicated, often futile ruminative cycles that are actively counterproductive. Regarding suicidality, one might imagine that an aggressive response to a stressor could have been adaptive for earlier humans fighting for social status or resources. Suicidality may represent this kind of aggression maladaptively turned inwards. Excessive rumination and suicidality are serious, debilitating symptoms with the latter potentially fatal. It seems at least as likely that they reflect a mismatch between the needs of modern humans and those of our recent ancestors than behaviours that should be considered healthy or adaptive at present.
On a separate note, Dr Hagen is absolutely correct that depression may represent a cry for help and that we need to do a better job of addressing its precipitants. But even if it has adaptive underpinnings, depression is clearly a source of true suffering and its theoretically adaptive value is an insufficient argument for withholding antidepressants or other treatments that may provide relief. Even if it has adaptive origins, we are not going to stop treating suicidality. We need to be careful to use evolutionary theory for its capacity to explain human behaviour rather than as a source of normative ethics. As scientists, we can certainly work toward understanding the use of some depressive symptoms, but as healers, when patients come to us for help, we must also seek to alleviate their suffering, adaptive or not.
Mark Sinyor, MSc, MD
Toronto, Ontario
Reply.. Letters to the Editor discussed in my review, we do not know if depressive rumination helps the average depressed person solve the problems that caused his or her depression because no one has ever investigated this. Instead, research has focused on how depressive rumination interferes with solving cognitive problems, such as memorizing strings of random numbers, that are completely unrelated to the problems that triggered the depression, such as the death of a loved one or a marital breakup. Although rumination by depressed patients may be maladaptive, as many therapists believe, on current evidence it is equally possible that such patients simply face life problems that are exceedingly difficult to solve.
Re: Evolutionary Approach Highly Informative but Should Not Be Overstated
Regarding suicidality, most suicide attempts fail. As mentioned in the review, there are more than 14 attempts for every completion; for young adult US women, there are more than 100. Those studies that actually investigated whether suicide attempts generate social benefits found that they do. Stegel et al, 3 for instance, followed up on patients admitted for suicide attempts, and documented numerous improvements in their lives, such as a better relationship with a special person, rousing of community aid, and reduced isolation. In a similar study, Lukianowicz 4 also discovered numerous social benefits following suicide attempts, including forcing a spouse to reconcile and avoiding prison. More research is needed to determine if such benefits are the direct consequences of the attempts and, if so, whether the benefits exceed the obvious costs of a suicide attempt.
Finally, I disagree that psychotherapists should "seek to alleviate their [patients'] suffering, adaptive or not." By that logic, doctors should always alleviate physical pain, adaptive or not. Yet physical pain often helps prevent further injury and promotes healing-if you have an injured limb, refrain from using it! Similarly, sadness is almost certainly a healthy response to adversity that may limit losses and promote healing.
The question is, Is depression a healthy or unhealthy response to the life problem that usually precedes it? Psychiatry treats this as a closed question: the severe costs of depression prove that it is unhealthy. However, evolutionary theory teaches us that most healthy functions have costs-the pain of a broken ankle, for instance, prevents the sufferer from working and caring for children. The point of my review is that this question needs to be reopened and examined using the conceptual tools provided by evolutionary theory: does depression generate benefits that compensate for its obvious costs? If so, treating depression symptoms will eliminate these benefits, resulting in net harm to the patient. The ratio of depression's benefits (if any) to its costs will not be discovered using clinical anecdotes, no matter how compelling, but only by systematic research in community populations.
Edward H Hagen, PhD
Vancouver, Washington
Evolutionary Explanations for Patients
Dear Editor:
In his editorial, Nesse 1 emphasized the importance of giving evolutionary explanations to patients and he mentioned that patients deeply appreciate this. However, giving evolutionary explanations can mean different things. Mayr 2 made a distinction between proximal and ultimate explanations. Proximal or mechanistic explanations answer the how question and ultimate explanations answer the why question.
A mechanistic explanation of anxiety disorders is explaining the smoke detector principle. It is far more costly not to be anxious in very dangerous situations than to be anxious in situations that in retrospect turn out not to be dangerous after all. However, different explanations for the underlying mechanism of anxiety disorders are possible. One could explain that anxiety is a form of learned behaviour through classical or operant conditioning and that patients can learn different behaviours with or without professional help. The latter explanation still fits within an evolutionary framework, but the relation is less straightforward and patients are unlikely to make a connection with evolutionary theory, if the latter explanation is given.
Ultimate explanations answering the why question are different. Regarding anxiety disorders, one could assert that having anxiety as a kind of smoke detector was advantageous for ancestors. The problem with this explanation is that the world view of patients varies. The limited research available in this area suggests that patients who agree with the standard medical explanatory model of their condition tend to be more satisfied with their treatment, 3 but in this study they did not specifically investigate evolutionary explanations.
Further research seems warranted, whether patients want to have an explanation answering the why question using evolutionary theory or whether they prefer to only have an explanation at a mechanistic level. Prima facie, one would expect that patients with certain religious views would not like an answer to the why question based on evolutionary theory.
